comebackThis is the second in a series of entries about David Frum’s new book.

Frum makes an interesting observation on page 32. He writes: “On their domestic policy records, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush rank as middle-of-the-road presidents, far less radical than say, Ronald Reagan or Harry Truman. Yet both Truman and Reagan drew support from across the partisan spectrum, while Clinton and Bush polarized the country.”

Frum explains this phenomena by arguing it is precisely because Bush and Clinton are so close on policy issues that they inspire such polarizing politics. But I’m not so sure. I wonder if both their centrist policies and their polarizing politics are symptoms of a bigger cause.

They both are evidence of the “dealignment” of the party system. Since Nixon, more and more people have refused to self-identify with either party, viewing both institutions as self-serving and corrupt. This has ironically lead to an intensification of partisanship as the parties seek to fortify their positions against the encroaching cynicism. They’ve become more ideological and have demanded more coherency than ever before.

But candidates, in order to win still have to reach out to those “dealigned” voters. This outreach leaves the partisans even more resentful and more set on party purity. Though, the majority of voters don’t respond to the hyper-partisan rhetoric, they have no common voice to offset the intense partisanship of each party base. Thus, the increase of polarization is evidence of a dysfunctional party system trying harder and harder to justify itself each election cycle.

Take McCain for example. The discontent he inspires in the Republican base is more a product of his refusal to be “partisan” than it is his specific positions on policy. Sure there are some principled libertarians angry over McCain-Feingold, and rightly so. But McCain’s biggest sins were his refusal to back the “nuclear option” during the debates over judicial nominees and his relatively moderate (and Reaganesque) position on immigration, hardly a point of traditional conservative orthodoxy.

As the parties become weaker, the demands for party loyalty become louder and louder. But demands for party loyalty, in turn, shrink the base even more.

We have to wonder whether there is a third party within the American electorate that has no way of organizing itself because of various efforts from the right and left to destroy access to the ballot, through campaign finance reform, through redistricting, and through ballot access laws.

Frum scratches the surface of this deep political dysfunction, but then explains it away as evidence that the modern Republican party is simply out of touch.